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An Epistemological Account of  the 
Logic of  Propaganda
Michael Badalamenti
sponsored by David Levy
AbstrAct
Propaganda is an un-avoidable feature of modern society. It has been identified with 
multiple global conflicts, oppressive totalitarianisms, and misinformation campaigns 
that threaten democracy. Despite the world’s popularization in discourse, it remains 
somewhat ambiguous, begetting many attempts to define and analyze the concept of 
propaganda. This project contributes to this effort by examining how propaganda in-
volves itself in logical forms of reasoning and judging its value from an epistemological 
perspective. Propaganda can be interpreted through logically argumentative forms. These 
arguments are always improper, involving an invalid form or false proposition; therefore, 
propaganda cannot directly provide real knowledge. Nevertheless, it succeeds in leading 
its audience to adopt a belief or action through nonlogical means and the manipula-
tion of available information. An individual may identify and avoid propagandas that 
rely solely on nonlogical techniques by working to identify their apparent logical flaws, 
although resisting them altogether still appears to be a major challenge. Unfortunately, 
propagandas that manipulate available information are far more difficult for an indi-
vidual to avoid, due to their leveraging of the propagandee’s lack of knowledge held by 
the propagandist and inability to find the truth themselves. The only way to effectively 
limit the negative epistemic influence of these propagandas may lie at the societal level, 
but specific solutions remain a subject of debate and additional research.
Items called “propaganda” have had an influential role in the history of the last centu-ry. In one infamous instance, the Nazi regime used propaganda to mobilize the Ger-man nation to initiate one of the most destructive and atrocious wars the world has 
ever seen (Appendix 1-a). More recently, the Russian state has been accused of using it 
to polarize politics in the United States in advance of the 2016 election (Appendix 1-d). 
Democratic governments have not abstained from sponsoring its production either, as 
evidenced by the United States’ mobilization for World War I and contemporary con-
troversies over the content of state textbooks (Appendix 1-e). Upon closer examination, 
propaganda does not appear to be the exclusive product of political entities, nor is it only 
involved in major events: indeed, it seems that it is proliferated by a variety of public and 
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private organizations and can target activities that seem relatively inconsequential, 
such as the decision of a consumer to buy one product over another.1
This apparent pervasiveness of propaganda, especially in relation to movements that 
look to be dangerous to the overall wellbeing of society, is what motivated me to begin 
this project. I chose to look at these things called propaganda from the perspective of 
epistemology, the study of knowledge, and to evaluate their effect on an individual’s 
ability to gain knowledge, something I consider to be basically and intrinsically good. 
To this end, I looked at how propaganda engages in forms of logical argumentation, 
as I consider logical reasoning to be the most reliable tool at an individual’s disposal 
for arriving at true conclusions from available information, for gaining knowledge.
In doing so, I have developed a unique definition for propaganda—which is compat-
ible with many pre-existing definitions—based in the necessarily improper format 
of its logical argumentation, and thereby its inability to give its audience knowledge 
directly. This definition can increase the capacity of an individual to identify, analyze, 
and potentially avoid certain kinds of propaganda, namely those with inherent logi-
cal flaws. There still exist other forms, however, that are more evasive, thanks to their 
manipulation of information made available to their audience and internal logical 
consistency, calling for more research into the subject of how these propagandas may 
be mitigated.
Background and Challenges to Defining Propaganda
To begin talking about propaganda, we must first establish a working understanding 
of the concept. Unfortunately, “propaganda” is a woefully ambiguous and sensation-
ally charged term, so much so that some researchers have suggested that it should be 
avoided in analytical contexts (Marlin, 2013, p. 4). Some of this ambiguity can be 
traced in the word’s complicated history. 
Examples of propaganda can be found as far back as the Peloponnesian War, but the 
modern term did not appear until the 17th century, when the Latin propagare was 
used by the Catholic Church to describe missionary efforts to spread, or propagate, 
the Catholic faith (Miller, 2005, p. 9). By the 19th century, the word was still rather 
obscure in the Anglosphere, but carried fairly neutral connotations when applied, 
with it being used to describe ideological crusades and campaigns to promote public 
health alike (Miller, 2005, pp. 10- 11). Social, political, and technological develop-
ments by the turn of the century allowed for the creation of the first true mass media 
campaigns, which were used extensively during World War I by the German, British, 
and American governments to facilitate military and industrial mobilization (Badsey, 
2014). The war had the effect of popularizing the word “propaganda” and, given the 
efficacy of these campaigns, legitimizing the careers of those involved in mass media 
persuasion (Miller, 2005, pp. 11-13).
1: This is not to suggest that all marketing is propaganda, though some of it is. This distinction is 
clarified in the Stipulative Definition section. For one example of marketing that is propaganda (Ap-
pendix 1-f ).
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This period also laid the groundwork for the word’s pejorative connotations in Eng-
lish. “Propaganda” was used to describe German information efforts, which were de-
nounced as malicious and deceitful, while the Allies avoided publicly applying the 
word to their own efforts, instead describing them as educational and informative 
(Miller, 2005, pp. 13-14). There was an attempt in the 1920s by some wartime propa-
gandists, many of whom had now turned to working for the private sector, to recover 
the term’s more neutral meaning, but these efforts failed (Miller, 2005, p. 15). Terms 
such as “marketing,” “advertising,” and “public relations” came to be used to describe 
their activities, while “propaganda” came to be associated with political and govern-
mental activities, even though this private sector work used remarkably similar tactics 
(Miller, 2005, pp. 18-19). The extensive use of propaganda by the German Nazis dur-
ing World War II and the Russian Communists during the Cold War seems to have 
solidified the word’s negative connotations throughout the English-speaking world.
This turbulent history produced a variety of definitions of propaganda. Edward Ber-
nays, an early pioneer and proponent of propaganda in the 1920s, described propa-
ganda as the means of communicating the complex views and information of an 
organization or individual to others in a more consumable form, as a part of popular 
discourse (Bernays, 2005, pp. 38-39). He argued that propaganda was a practical ne-
cessity for a modern democratic society, as without it, the discourse at the foundation 
of democratic decision-making would be unworkable, because people lack the means 
needed to properly hear and digest the complete views of competing interests (Ber-
nays, 2005, pp. 37-38). According to him, propaganda is actually beneficial to society, 
so long as propagandists followed a proper code of ethics (Bernays, 2005, pp. 69-70). 
By contrast, Jacques Ellul, a French philosopher and sociologist that wrote in the 
1960s and 70s, saw propaganda as an inevitable yet distinctly negative sociological 
phenomenon within a mass society, defined in a non-exhaustive way as “a set of meth-
ods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive 
participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through 
psychological manipulations" (Ellul, 1973, p. 61). Additionally, for Ellul, only suc-
cessful propaganda is real propaganda (Ellul, 1973). It must totally encircle each in-
dividual’s ability to find information, exercising every medium available, becoming 
constant, unignorable, and unchallenged, as anything less would fail in subjugating 
the individual to the propagandist (Ellul, 1973, pp. 9-14).
Disagreement over a proper definition of propaganda remains in the 21st century, es-
pecially over the necessary characteristics of propaganda. Such controversial or vague 
elements of definitions include: whether or not propaganda must be produced or 
spread by some intention; the relationship propaganda may have with truth; whether 
or not propaganda is necessarily beneficial or detrimental to a society; whether or not 
propaganda has some inherent ethical skew; the degree to which propaganda may 
involve actual alterations to an individual’s environment or condition; the acceptable 
subject matter of propaganda (e.g. whether commercial marketing is a form of propa-
ganda, or if it should be treated as a separate category, with propaganda restricted to 
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the political realm); the audience for propaganda (whether it must target an entire 
society, a group, or just one individual); whether true propaganda must be successful 
or not; whether propaganda must seek to inspire action, or if shaping attitudes and 
beliefs is sufficient; and, whether propaganda must involve a large, organized cam-
paign, or if more singular efforts can be included.2 
Considering these controversies is a significant task when discussing propaganda. 
Should one draw a conclusion about a more restrictive definition of propaganda, 
another may inappropriately generalize that conclusion to a broader definition. How-
ever, resolving many of these controversies would be time consuming and of lim-
ited use for the purposes of more narrow research. Therefore, I seek to establish a 
somewhat broad definition for propaganda that aids an epistemological analysis, one 
that hopefully accommodates the entire set of things that could legitimately be called 
propaganda in its modern sense by avoiding qualifiers that should be the focus of 
other types of inquiry into the subject (e.g. ethical inquiries). The definition that I 
seek to establish here draws inspiration most directly from Randal Marlin’s definition, 
which describes propaganda as “the organized attempt through communication to af-
fect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent 
or suppress an individual’s adequately informed, rational, reflective judgement. (Mar-
lin, 2013, pp. 12-13). Jason Stanley also provides an inspirational characterization of 
propaganda, describing it as a contribution to public discourse related to supporting 
or repairing a flawed ideology, which is a system of belief that obstructs an individual’s 
ability to gain knowledge within a domain (Stanley, 2015. pp. 52-56). However, this 
definition diverges considerably from these precursors by construing propaganda in a 
way that highlights how its defining features can be considered from the perspective 
of logical reasoning.
Stipulative Definition of  Propaganda
Propaganda is an argument—or something that is intended to inspire an argument—
toward a conclusion that a person or people are led to believe is proper, thereby in-
spiring belief or action, but is actually improper. A proper argument is one that cor-
rectly follows the rules of a form of logical reasoning. For example: if the argument is 
deductive, it is proper if and only if it is valid and sound; if it is inductive, this means 
it is strong and cogent; if it is abductive, this means it is simple, practical, and prob-
able. Moreover, proper arguments are made with consideration paid to all potential-
ly-relevant available information,3 so that potential defeating evidence and counter 
2:Such differences are found between the definitions established by various scholars that are discussed 
by Ellul’s Men’s Attitudes, Marlin’s Persuasion in pages 7-12, and Stanley in pages 48-53.
3: I will admit that this is an ambiguous notion. I lack a way to state generally what sort of informa-
tion is or is not relevant to an argument. Pitting an argument against all of the information available 
to an individual would be an impossible task, and probably largely pointless—why ensure that an 
argument about tomorrow’s weather forecast is consistent with the color of a banana? However, it 
is also possible that information that seems irrelevant on the surface could lead to some contradic-
tory implications. Ultimately, we are only human. My point here is that there should be a good faith 
effort to consider potential contradictions to an argument when possible. This is a problem shared in 
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arguments are accommodated, whether by disproving competing claims or reserving 
some skepticism towards the conclusion. By contrast, improper arguments include 
invalid deductive arguments, weak inductive arguments, improbable and impracti-
cal abductive arguments, arguments predicated on false premises, uncertain forms of 
inference that ascribe undue certainty to their conclusions, arguments made in willful 
ignorance of an available defeating counterargument, and other forms of fallacious 
logic, such as circular reasoning. Any or all of the premises or the conclusion of a 
propaganda argument may actually be true or false statements about the world; if all 
are true, the problem lies in the connection between them being illogical. 
Any informational medium—a thing that is capable of conveying information—
whether it be visual or auditory, artistic or academic, an object, an event, or anything 
in between, may act as propaganda, and media that began without a propagandist 
purpose may be transformed into propaganda when presented in a certain context. 
Any parts of the argument may be explicit in the propaganda or merely implied by, 
with the expectation that its audience will receive it in a certain way. Propaganda may 
be spread unwittingly, but it seems to require some sort of intention at its inception, 
although this intention may not necessarily be malicious or even conscious that it is 
producing propaganda. There could be many possible causes behind this propaganda-
producing intention, such as a desire to deceive, apathy towards the truth, a belief 
that one knows truth despite failure in some epistemic duty, loyalty to some dogma, a 
drive for some self-interest, or a desire to legitimately help society. The original propa-
gandist is the person or group that supplies this intention at the time of a propaganda’s 
production, while “propagandist” more generally denotes any person, group, or thing 
that has the effect of leading, or attempts to lead, a person or people to believe that a 
propaganda argument is proper, regardless of the existence of intention. The “propa-
gandee” is the propaganda’s audience, whether intended or actual.
This definition should be understood in relation to a few other terms and concepts. 
A propaganda campaign is the coordinated use of multiple separate propagandas to 
inspire the same belief or action, or a related set of beliefs or actions. A propaganda re-
gime is such a campaign that achieves a hegemonic status over a society, such that it is 
widely accepted and nearly inescapable for those within the society, making refutation 
of it a seemingly futile effort.4 A person or people may perceive any information in an 
entirely unintended, illogical way, but while such misperception may have essentially 
the same effect on them as propaganda, this phenomenon is perhaps better called 
mistakenness or misunderstanding than propaganda. True education, understood as 
epistemology by responses to the Gettier problem: Gilbert Harman, for instance, said, “It is not at all 
clear what distinguishes evidence that undermines knowledge from evidence that does not” (Harman, 
2008, p. 204). This problem is also analogous to a problem facing a coherentist theory of knowledge: 
what sort of body of beliefs must a belief cohere with for it to be justified? Beliefs that are conceptu-
ally relevant, or all other beliefs? (Goldman & McGrath, 2015, pp. 11-12).
4: This concept draws inspiration from the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault on 
hegemonic discourse, referenced by Marlin in his talk of definitions (Marlin, 2013, p. 6); it also 
draws significant inspiration from Ellul’s conception of propaganda, most notably what he calls “total 
propaganda” (Ellul, 1973, pp. 9-17).
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the medium by which a person or people are taught the truth by proper arguments, 
is not propaganda. In practical reality, however, education is often difficult to distin-
guish from propaganda, as propaganda efforts are likely to masquerade as education. 
Furthermore, factors such as uncertainty towards the truth of premises in a proper 
argument, uncertainty towards the sort of intention at an argument’s origin, and com-
peting propagandas may cause an individual, especially a cynical one, to mislabel true 
education as propaganda. Both propaganda and education are forms of persuasion, 
understood as the general attempt to inspire belief. Marketing is another form of 
persuasion, with the term merely indicating some relationship to commerce. Items of 
marketing may fall under either category of education or propaganda. Public relations 
is a form of persuasion too, one that denotes a focus on one entity’s perception among 
a general public audience.
Propaganda is also related to the concept of knowledge. In epistemology, knowledge is 
traditionally defined as a true belief that the believer has a proper undefeated justifica-
tion for believing (Goldman & McGrath, 2015, pp. 52-56). Under this definition, 
propaganda arguments cannot grant a person true knowledge, at least not directly. If 
the propaganda is spreading mistruths, then the beliefs it instills are false, and there-
fore does not provide knowledge. If the argument it presents is improper, whether it 
be deductive and invalid, inductive and weak, or otherwise fallacious, but the conclu-
sion is true, it has still failed to provide its audience with a proper justification, and 
thereby knowledge, even if they have indeed adopted a true belief. A propaganda 
argument can only provide its audience with an unjustified false belief, a justified false 
belief, or an unjustified true belief. When it comes to the presentation of information 
in logical forms, true education, not propaganda, is the path to real knowledge, to 
justified true belief. However, a piece of propaganda may grant knowledge indirectly, 
outside of its function as propaganda: for example, it would be reasonable to conclude 
from a poster encouraging the public to buy war bonds that a war bonds program ex-
ists, and that the nation is in a state of war. Considered in this way, the piece would 
serve a secondary educative purpose outside of its primary purpose as propaganda.
The Logical Definition at Work: Interpreting a Piece of  
Propaganda
To show how this definition may be used to interpret a piece of propaganda, consider 
the following poster, designed by Harry Hopps in 1917 for distribution in the United 
States to encourage enlistment for World War I (Hopps, 1918):
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The primary purpose of the poster appears to be to get men to enlist in the military, 
indicated by the command at the bottom. This does not mean that the poster only tar-
gets men who are able to enlist: indeed, it may sway others to view what the military 
is doing more favorably, or encourage them to pressure the men they know who can 
enlist to do so, compounding the propaganda’s efficacy. For the sake of brevity, how-
ever, I will only focus on a few propaganda arguments the poster intends to convey to 
the perspective of a man of enlistment age. The conclusion they are intended to derive 
is, “I should (or must) enlist in the military.” The following short, simple argument 
can be immediately derived from the text:
1) This mad brute should be destroyed.
2) Therefore, I should enlist.
This argument is invalid and therefore, if intended alone, a propaganda argument. 
However, the argument can be made valid if the propagandee is expected to supply a 
premise: “If this mad brute should be destroyed, then I should enlist.” But this argu-
ment still lacks justification, evidence, and fails to incorporate significant elements 
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of the poster. A stronger argument intended by the poster should be considered to 
determine whether or not it still passes as propaganda.
The large, ape-like character in a pickelhaube, alongside the descriptive “this mad 
brute,” are meant to convey a premise that “the Germans are brutes.” The distressed 
woman and bloody club, labelled “kultur,” further emphasize that point and provide 
some evidence of the atrocity that a brutish German may cause. The poster’s com-
mand to “destroy this mad brute” prompts a premise that so-called mad brutes should 
be destroyed, a premise that may be supported by societal norms of justice encoun-
tered by an individual throughout their lifetime in education and other propagandas. 
Other media at the time would have surely indicated that the country is at war against 
the Germans, providing another premise; it is therefore unnecessary for the poster to 
supply that information. Finally, it is implied through the “enlist” command’s inclu-
sion that an individual’s enlistment will help the nation in its war, and thereby aid the 
goal of destroying the Germans. The following is one valid way this argument can be 
structured:
1) The Germans are mad brutes that cause harm to others.
2) Mad brutes that cause harm to others should be destroyed.
3) The Germans should be destroyed.
4) If my country is fighting in a war to destroy the Germans and the Germans 
should be destroyed, then I should enlist (since I will thereby help the war ef-
fort).
5) My country is fighting in a war to destroy the Germans.
6) I should enlist.
The poster conveys an additional, separate argument, one that appeals more to the 
propagandee’s self-interest than some high-minded righteousness. The German brute 
is shown stepping onto a shore labelled “America,” implying an imminent threat of 
invasion. No longer are his atrocities limited to Europe. Now, the propagandee’s own 
livelihood is at stake. This second argument may look something like the following:
1) The Germans are going to invade my country.
2) If the Germans invade my country, they are going to threaten my way of 
life.
3) If something threatens my way of life, I should fight against it.
4) I should fight against the Germans (which I can do by enlisting).
These two arguments are better justified than the initial invalid one, as their premises 
appear to be supported by evidence. If all of their premises are true, they would be 
educative rather than propagandist and would render knowledge to their audience, so 
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long as they correctly interpreted these arguments. However, both of these arguments 
contain at least one premise that is arguably false, thereby rendering them unsound 
and propagandist.
In the first argument, support for the idea that the Germans are mad brutes, the justi-
fication for their destruction, is arguably weak and should thus be treated as false. On 
what basis could they be called brutes, insofar as a brute is understood to be some-
thing subhuman? The mere drawing featured in the poster of a German as an ape-like 
creature is certainly insufficient evidence. 
One could use their actions as evidence. It is true that the Germans pioneered some of 
the cruelest weapons of the war, including chlorine gas and the flamethrower. Howev-
er, the allied powers also came to adopt and further develop these weapons. Likewise, 
both sides committed abuses against prisoners of war and broke the rules of warfare 
set forth by the Hague Conventions. The Germans did undeniably commit numer-
ous atrocities in occupied territories, albeit not to the extremes purported by Allied 
propaganda; one could argue that these atrocities outweighed those committed by the 
Allies, but, since the Allies—save Russia, who did commit similar atrocities during 
their occupation of Austro-Hungarian territories—were never similarly positioned 
to occupy German territory in Europe, it is difficult to conclude that they might not 
have acted similarly (Kramer, 2017). The Germans are therefore worthy of condem-
nation, and perhaps retaliatory action, but this is not the same as labelling them as 
subhuman brutes. 
How else could the Germans be labelled subhuman brutes, since it would be contra-
dictory to call them such for committing acts comparable to those of the Allied pow-
ers, who do not label themselves as brutes? If one could identify a few Germans that 
are unquestionably mad brutes, that would still be scant proof that every German is a 
mad brute. Perhaps the mad brute refers not to the German people, but to the mon-
archist, autocratic German state. But if that is the case, how could an alliance with 
tsarist Russia, an equally oppressive regime led by a cousin of the Kaiser, be justified? 
It seems that the brute moniker, and all of the grievous connotations that come with 
it, are unearned, applied only because dehumanizing a wartime enemy helps to rally 
people to the cause. This argument is consequently propaganda, if only because the 
premise calling the Germans brutes, classifying them as sub-human monsters, is too 
strong given the available evidence.
In the second argument, the idea that a German invasion of US shores after 1917 
is possible, never mind imminent, is weakly supported. Even ignoring the challenge 
posed by the U.S. Navy, the Imperial German Navy, having struggled to combat the 
British Royal Navy and facing an increasing state of collapse after the 1916 Battle of 
Jutland, would have been insufficient to provide the logistical support necessary for a 
significant naval invasion of the United States; not to mention how German ground 
forces were bogged down in France since the start of the war (Osborne, 2014). A naval 
invasion of the United Kingdom, a much closer target, would have still been unreal-
9
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istic. Ultimately, this argument rests on fear to incite action, but this fear can only be 
inspired by those who are ignorant of the practical realities of warfare and the German 
situation. Once the impossibility of a German invasion is realized, the argument is 
revealed as propaganda based on blatant lies, considering that the Army, who must be 
well-versed in the practical realities of warfare, appears to be promoting it.
There is a third valid argument that could be intended by the poster when consider-
ing the trustworthiness of its source, one that is a bit more difficult to definitively call 
propaganda:
1) The U.S. government says that I should enlist.
2) The U.S. government is a trustworthy authority in matters of the national 
interest, and by extension matters of my own interest.
3) I should adopt the beliefs touted by trustworthy authorities (as they are 
probably true) and follow their advice regarding matters relevant to their com-
petencies.
4) I should enlist.
This argument might not be intentional considering the context of the poster. If it is 
intended as a possible legitimate interpretation, it is not stressed nearly as much as the 
two prior arguments: the only element of the poster that clearly indicates its source is 
the faint watermark that says “U.S. Army.” Nothing in the poster appears to purport 
the trustworthiness or competency of the U.S. military or government in support of 
the second premise, outside of the suggestion that, in this instance, they are doing the 
right thing by fighting the German brute—but in that case, the prior two arguments 
are advanced anyways, rendering this one pointless.
Maybe support for this controversial second premise is supposed to come from some 
other source, as part of a larger campaign. In that case, what evidence could there be? 
The evidence cannot come from information propagated by the U.S. government 
alone, otherwise all of the arguments would be, “The U.S. government is trustworthy 
because the U.S. government says they are trustworthy,” resulting in a logically fal-
lacious circularity. Support for the premise would also be weak if all of the evidence 
came from independent sources that had a vested interest in the people believing 
in the U.S. government’s trustworthiness, like an empowered political party seeking 
reelection or an influential lobbyist group. The government’s historical record could 
provide some insight, but the fact that executive officeholders change with each elec-
tion raises questions over the relevance of a longer-term analysis. However, a lack of 
strong supporting evidence does not disprove the statement, either. 
The government’s trustworthiness in this expanded context thus seems uncertain and 
debatable. If it is true that the government is trustworthy, this argument would be 
proper, educative, and provide the propagandee with knowledge. Knowledge derived 
from an authority’s word may not be as useful as knowledge justified in other ways, 
10
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as it is difficult to draw additional conclusions from such cursory evidence, but it is 
still an epistemic justification. Nevertheless, even if this premise could be proven to be 
true, the poster would remain as a piece of propaganda altogether due to the presence 
of the other arguments.
Just because these arguments are propaganda, however, does not mean that it is false 
that men should have enlisted for World War I. Participation in the war may very 
well have furthered the nation’s—and consequently its people’s—long-term strategic 
interests. Individuals that enlisted could have had the potential to reap certain rewards 
from their society for their contribution. It also could be false, though. Perhaps an 
isolationist policy would have been sustainable and better for the American people 
given the U.S.’s geopolitical situation. For a particular individual, maybe there is a 
good physical or mental health reason why they should not enlist, even if they can. 
Whether or not a person should enlist to fight in a war is a complicated question. 
There is an objective answer as to what is best in terms of certain metrics, but that 
answer is often obscured, difficult to determine from the limited information of the 
present. A poster like this is unhelpful in trying to determine that answer. A person 
needs information that is presented carefully, arguments that are clear and justified 
with caveats to highlight exceptions and warn of uncertainties, in order to have any 
hope of realizing the truth in an appropriate amount of time.
Defense of  the Logical Definition Against Potential 
Criticisms
There are some who may criticize this definition and construction of propaganda 
for, in their eyes, mischaracterizing propaganda. One such criticism may be over my 
inclusion of media and arguments that target individuals, rather than the mass. Cer-
tainly, the character of propagandas that target the mass differ greatly from those that 
target individuals and smaller groups. Propaganda aimed at the mass must adopt 
forms that appeal to the mass, forms that both accommodate and minimize the in-
dividual, making them feel significant while also small, by being relatable, identifi-
able, and empathetic while simultaneously vague and general (Ellul, 1973, pp. 6-9). 
Arguments that target other people may play off their particular histories, character 
traits, and interests. I do not deny this, but I do deny that this second category is 
not propaganda. The motivation for excluding this category seems to be an assertion 
that the propagandist is not concerned with winning over particular individuals with 
particular efforts, because such efforts are expensive at scale and thereby provide little 
value (Ellul, 1973, p. 6). To the contrary, the propagandist may find it valuable to 
target certain individuals: namely, leaders within society. If a propagandist can convert 
the individuals who other people already trust and follow to their cause, such as politi-
cians, business elites, celebrities, influencers, and the leaders of groups like religious 
organizations, trade unions, interest groups, and clubs, they can achieve the effects of 
a mass campaign without adopting the character of a mass campaign (Bernays, 1928, 
pp. 40-44). Therefore, it seems misguided to exclude those more personal, targeted 
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techniques from the category of propaganda, even when those techniques are used on 
a relatively insignificant individual.
Another objection may concern intention. A critic could argue that, in defining prop-
aganda, the focus should be on how it affects an audience, how it is perceived, not on 
its production. I assent that it is important to consider propaganda from the position 
of its audience, but defining it from this perspective presents difficulties. For one, I 
would question how such an approach would assess pieces of information intended 
as propaganda that fail to garner an audience. The inability to identify some propa-
gandas from the audience’s perspective presents another problem. Regardless, I will 
consider an example of how propaganda could arise entirely without intention, to see 
if this definitional approach is unjustified.
A group of people could conceivably draw some association between two things on 
their own, say, between a political party and a color that just so happens to be used 
by its members more often than not in promotional materials, without there ever 
having been an effort by anyone to intentionally instill that association. Then, they 
could simultaneously associate one of those things with a third thing, like that same 
color with a soft drink that happens to be that color. This group of people could then 
associate the other original thing with that third thing, the political party with the soft 
drink, without there being a proper reason to do so. If someone from this group saw a 
person drinking the soft drink, they might consequently think of the political party or 
illogically assume that the person is associated with the party in some way, influencing 
how they behave towards them. As a result, the people in this group would hold the 
same beliefs and act the same as if they had been subjected to an intentional campaign 
to associate the soft drink with the political party.
I think it is true that a group’s own subconscious creation of illogical associations in 
a scenario like this—if it is possible—would have the same effect on them as an in-
tentional campaign. However, I hesitate to relate this process more directly to propa-
ganda. Propaganda seems to involve some kind of subversion or abuse of a person’s 
capacity for critical thought, and such subversion or abuse appears to require inten-
tion (Marlin, 2013, p. 5). I think that this scenario, which only involves faulty critical 
thought, not subversion or abuse, is better characterized as a widespread misunder-
standing, as mistakenness, which, if subsumed under the category of propaganda, 
would risk overextending the concept of propaganda.
Suppose another possible example of misunderstanding, where a group listened to a 
typically trustworthy radio broadcast and heard the message, “The Yankees win and 
will go on to the World Series.” From this, they justifiably concluded that the Yankees 
must have won and will appear in the World Series. As Yankees fans, they excitedly 
shut off the radio and purchased tickets to the World Series. But, unknown to them, 
the actual message was, “The Yankees did not win and will not go on to the World 
Series.” Interference caused this message to be distorted, cutting out the “did not” 
and “not” in a way that made the perceived message seem legitimate, not distorted. 
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The fans’ perception of the situation thus resulted in a justified false belief. Could this 
misunderstanding rightfully be construed as propaganda, since it affected them the 
same way as an intended propaganda could have? 
I do not think so. Although successful propaganda is sufficient for unjustified belief 
or justified false belief, it is not necessary for either; there are, for example, non-
logical things that can instill and justify belief. If this misunderstanding can be called 
propaganda, from where did its logical argument originate? The radio, a non-thinking 
thing, could not have formulated such an argument, and the radio host in fact formu-
lated an argument contrary to the message that was perceived. Perhaps you could say 
that the fans propagandized themselves, concluding that the Yankees won on a false 
premise, that the radio was reliable, in an argument that they invented for themselves. 
I am skeptical toward this answer, as its feasibility is rooted in controversial questions 
about the nature of the mind, agency, and intention, questions that I cannot resolve 
here.5 I do think that it is possible for a person to propagandize themselves using 
intention, for instance by intentionally surrounding themselves with certain kinds 
of information to protect their sensibilities, as in an echo chamber. However, in this 
case, there is no conceivable intention that the fans could have had to risk deceiving 
themselves, as deceiving themselves only resulted in them buying tickets to a game 
that will certainly disappoint them.6
Finally, there are some objections that may criticize the logically argumentative nature 
of this definition of propaganda. One could argue that commands, which are com-
mon features of propaganda, are not arguments. I would respond that a person may 
need reason to follow the commands present on propaganda. The commands inspire 
an argument that a person should or should not do what the command says—therein 
lies the argumentation. 
5: If a mental process besides intention that creates logical arguments does exist, then the argumen-
tative ideas communicated by this process to the rest of the mind or to others—not the radio or 
anything else in the world that inspired these ideas—could perhaps be called propaganda, in which 
case you have propaganda that arises without intention. However, I cannot say for certain whether 
subsuming such ideas under the category of propaganda would be appropriate. My notion of inten-
tion is admittedly somewhat vague, and these are questions that are probably better left to someone 
that is better-versed in psychology and the philosophy of mind than myself.
 6: I should note that if these fans then went on to intentionally spread their belief that the Yankees 
won (e.g.  via the argumentation “I heard the Yankees won on the radio; the radio tells the truth; I 
heard the radio’s message correctly; therefore the Yankees won.”)—if a misperception is intentionally 
communicated, even though the communicator is unaware that they hold such ideas as a result of 
misperception and are communicating them because they earnestly believe them to be true—then 
such communications could rightfully be called propaganda (as these justified false beliefs have now 
actually been formulated as an improper argument), and the fans could be called original propagan-
dists. However, since the ideas they spread originated as justified false beliefs, such original propagan-
dists could probably be called less culpable for their propaganda than those that intentionally lie or 
ignore the truth. I imagine that they would quickly stop producing this propaganda once they discov-
ered evidence to the contrary, that the Yankees lost.
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A stronger objection concerns what psychiatrist Vladimir Bekhterev called reflexology 
(Marlin, 2013, p. 74). This idea suggests that the aim of propaganda is not typically 
to engage the propagandee in a process of rational thought, which they would need 
to use to consider logical argumentation. Instead, it is meant to foster a reflexive, 
habitual reaction to information, so as to circumvent any rational process that might 
uncover its flaws. If this theory explains how much of propaganda works, how could 
it be said that it necessarily intends to inspire an argument? 
I do not disagree with this assessment. It does not seem that our minds operate purely 
on logical processes; for instance, our thinking seems to involve nonlogical processes 
like heuristics. So much as a word, like “honor” or “freedom,” may invite a sensational 
feeling or habitual connection due to its meaning or regular associations, and those 
attributes can influence one’s disposition towards a broader idea (Stanley, 2015, pp. 
2-4). Bekhterev’s reflexology provides an explanation for how a lot of propaganda 
succeeds.
There is reason to consider staying with the argumentative definition nonetheless. 
Even if propaganda may not be intended to be perceived in a logical form, its intend-
ed effects can still be expressed in a logical form for the purpose of analysis. Would-be 
propagandees who are subjected to this kind of propaganda might still be able to try 
to dissect what such a piece is trying to argue to them, if they have not developed a ha-
bitual response to its symbols or become curious as to why it expresses some attitude. 
This admittedly risks introducing some subjectivity into the analysis of propaganda, 
as it is impossible to know with certainty what argumentative mapping the original 
propagandist would have agreed is most representative of their message. Yet this is a 
problem that arises in any analysis of an author’s intent. Without direct access to the 
original propagandist’s mind, it is impossible to know what they intended to say with 
certainty, even in propagandas that assume a logical form. Intent can only be extrapo-
lated from the available evidence. Because of this uncertainty, one should try to con-
sider a few of the strongest potential arguments that could be made by the propaganda 
when conducting this sort of analysis, involving both as many of the propaganda’s 
elements as possible and information that would have readily been available to the 
propaganda’s audience in its original context.
That said, the reflexologist’s objection is significant in shedding light on how propa-
ganda subverts, avoids, and abuses a person’s capacity to consider it rationally. If our 
minds did operate strictly on the rules of logic, it is difficult to see how propaganda 
could be so successful, as we would conceivably be more apt to identify its flaws. 
This definition does not seek to diminish this reality; it merely seeks to ascribe these 
alternative constructions to an explanation of how propaganda works, rather than an 
explanation of what it fundamentally is.
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So, how does propaganda work? How are people convinced to adopt beliefs that do 
not pass logical scrutiny, that lack epistemic justification? There are numerous tech-
niques that achieve this end, which many scholars have explored in depth. Some of 
these techniques concern the content of a propaganda argument itself, while others 
have to do with the context in which an argument is presented. I will call attention 
to a few.
According to Bekhterev, a reflexology response may be achieved through a specific 
three-step process. First, the individual is physically exhausted through prolonged 
confinement, making them psychologically vulnerable. Next, they are forced to con-
centrate on a single subject, the propaganda, for an extended period, undermining 
their ability to concentrate. Then, the propaganda expresses certain moods, prompt-
ing the audience to echo those moods, thereby building reflexive associations between 
ideas and emotions (Marlin, 2013, p. 74). This process thereby instills a belief by by-
passing the audience’s capacity for logical reasoning. Rallies in Nazi Germany, where 
crowds of people stood outside for hours focused on the highly emotive speeches of 
Adolf Hitler, provide a good case of reflexology at work (Marlin, 2013, p. 74). Con-
ceivably, this is not the only process that may create such a reflex-response, but just 
one example of how it may be achieved.
Propagandas need not always create their own habitual responses. By invoking sacred, 
emotionally charged ideas already present in society, propaganda can achieve the same 
effect with less of a concentrated effort; in fact, this method is more common than 
efforts to create new responses, at least initially in a campaign, as propaganda would 
struggle to survive if it contradicted sacred norms (Ellul, 1973, p. 35). Victor Klem-
perer, a German Jew who lived through the Nazi regime, talks about how he would 
speak with people in a school about the meanings of culture, democracy, and other 
ideas, and while it appeared that he was making progress in moving them away from 
Nazism, all it took was the invocation of heroism, talk of some heroic person or act, 
to reverse this progress and render discussion futile (Stanley, 2015, pp. 2-3). The way 
that an issue is framed, the ideals that it implicates itself with, will affect the imme-
diate perceptions of the propagandee, thereby biasing them to receive the issue in a 
certain way (Marlin, 2013, pp. 96-98). 
Propaganda need not even serve the ideals it touts. Stanley establishes a category of 
propaganda called undermining propaganda that presents itself as an embodiment of 
certain ideals despite effectively eroding them (Stanley, 2015, p. 53). As an example, 
he points to the Citizens United case: the Supreme Court extended constitutional 
rights to corporations, touting the decision as a defense of democratic ideals of free 
expression, while the practical effect of this decision was to erode these ideals by allow-
ing corporations to use their wealth to crowd out smaller, less powerful voices (Stan-
ley, 2015, p. 61). Propaganda can also associate itself with everyday things, rather 
than venerated ideals, to achieve this kind of response. If it becomes associated with 
a cultural icon, like a celebrity or a buzzword, of which a popular perception already 
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exists, that propaganda will likely inherit part of that popular perception, despite a 
lack of a logical reason for this association (Marlin, 2013, p. 96).
The use of deceptive language can support propaganda. Linguist Dwight Bolinger 
identifies some ways that sentences can be manipulated to change the ideas that they 
express. The things left unsaid are as significant as the things that are actually said, but 
they are harder to pick up on. Using more passive language that removes an agent—
“Jane kicked the ball” versus “the ball was kicked”—can lighten the perception of that 
agent’s responsibility for some event. Using more positive terms, like “surgical strike” 
instead of “precision bombing,” can soften the impact of serious news. By omitting 
significant information, such as by saying, “It is believed that 10,000 people attended 
the rally,” leaving out the fact that this belief was held by a single overly-optimistic 
person who cannot count, one can technically tell the truth while conveying a false 
impression (Marlin, 2013, p. 99-101). Another example from Eric Swanson shows 
how ambiguities and vagueness in language, which he calls failures of shared informa-
tion, can be utilized. A political campaign could use rhetoric that conjures different 
ideas in different people to gain support; for instance, appealing to a vague notion 
of freedom could attract the attention of both socialists and laissez-faire liberals, as 
both embrace a concept of freedom, but the ways they define freedom differ radically 
(Swanson, 2017, pp. 939-941). 
Similarly, statistical information can be manipulated to advance improper arguments. 
By adjusting the scale of a graph, significant differences or similarities in data can be 
visually obscured or implied. Correlations in data can be stressed to improperly sug-
gest causation. Averages can be skewed by adding outliers. Polling data can be biased 
by asking leading questions, and an unrepresentative sample of people can be used. 
Additionally, data can be outright fabricated, since it will probably take another per-
son a significant amount of time to verify it (Marlin, 2013, pp. 129-134). Statistics 
seem to be particularly useful in propaganda since they carry an air of irrefutable sci-
entific fact, one that can obscure the disingenuous mechanisms that may lay at their 
source.
Propaganda can assume a form that appears logical at a glance, but is revealed to have 
some flaw upon closer examination. Bandwagoning happens when an argument is 
meant to be believed on the basis that virtually everyone agrees with it. While consen-
sus among informed agents may provide strong grounds for an inductive argument, 
this consensus is meaningless if everyone within the agreeing mass lacks justification 
for the belief outside of its being a mass belief. Likewise, adopting a belief after it is 
endorsed by a certified expert is inductively reasonable, but propaganda may be pre-
sented by people that only have the appearance of being experts, whose credentials are 
suspect or who are untrustworthy (Marlin, 2013, pp. 102-105). A long list of logical 
fallacies, including ad hominem attacks, post hoc, ergo propter hoc arguments, hasty 
generalizations, and begging the question fall under this category, too (Marlin, 2013, 
pp. 110-113).
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Many of these techniques show how propaganda uses a distorted version of the truth 
to imply a false reality. Propaganda can also plainly lie—argue in defiance of a known 
truth—or bullshit—argue with insouciance towards whatever the truth is—but lying 
and bullshitting are more dangerous (Cassam, 2018, p. 3). Such claims can be contra-
dicted, proven demonstrably false, damaging the credibility of the propagandist. It is 
much better for the propagandist to twist true information, to associate propagandist 
goals with irrefutable facts, even if the connection is illogical, and to be able refute 
contradictions as mere differences of interpretation (Ellul, 1973, pp. 52-57). When 
propaganda does involve blatant falsehoods, it is best if they are presented alongside 
an abundance of other information. This information need not be particularly rel-
evant: the goal is to overwhelm the propagandee with more information than they 
can practically scrutinize, to exceed their capacity to resist (Ellul, 1973, p. 18). Even 
if they find some lies, there is too much other information to contradict—independ-
ent arguments that also supposedly support the conclusion—making refutation of 
the entire propaganda infeasible. Many will thereby take the propagandist at their 
word, trusting that the mass of so-called evidence has at least some truth to it. An ex-
ample could be a shoddy but lengthy research paper, where people accept the paper’s 
conclusion because they only glossed over a hundred pages of dense but nonsensical 
language offered as evidence.
A propaganda regime can take overwhelming a propagandee to the extreme. In what 
Ellul calls total propaganda, the relentless exposure of an individual to organized 
propaganda across different media that pervade an individual’s life, eliminating the 
ability to retreat, can capture the mind of the propagandee in its totality, driving them 
to accept an idea that lacks proper justification axiomatically ((Ellul, 1973, pp. 9-10). 
The propagandist essentially places the propagandee in a sort of Cartesian demon 
world, where they have no hope of finding truth and gaining knowledge through typi-
cal means. This tends to require an accompanying censorship campaign, as dissenting 
views will dramatically weaken the effect of a propaganda regime, although it may be 
possible for total propaganda to crowd out other views on its own (Ellul, 1973, pp. 
11-12). The destructive power of freedom of information to a propaganda regime can 
be seen in the collapse of the Soviet Union. While doubt towards the Communist 
party line existed prior, Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika enabled the 
dissemination of dissent, revealing the extent of Pravda’s mistruths and causing the 
people to reject it in favor of newly available alternative sources of information from 
the West, hastening the Union’s collapse.
Categories of  Techniques: Misdirection and Misinformation
There seem to be two general categories that propagandist techniques can be roughly 
broken up into. When it uses appeals to emotions or ideals, associations with popu-
larly-perceived icons, soft language, words with multiple meanings, logical fallacies, 
manipulated statistics and data presentations, or an overwhelming amount of dis-
tracting information, but all information relevant to the subject matter is available, it 
seeks acceptance by distracting the propagandee from their capacity for proper logical 
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reasoning, hoping that they are not paying close attention. This first category of tech-
niques can be called misdirection. If a hypothetical perfect logical thinker—who only 
accepts beliefs based on their logical reasonableness, is not prone to human conditions 
like emotion and habit, and can process an infinite amount of information—were to 
analyze propaganda that relies only upon these techniques, they would be able to cor-
rectly identify it as propaganda, pointing out the lies, contradictions, or lack of real 
evidence present within.
The other category of propagandist techniques relies upon leveraging the propa-
gandee’s ignorance or uncertainty, their lack of knowledge. When it selectively omits 
key information that cannot be found in other sources, appeals to authorities that 
seem proper to the propagandee but are actually untrustworthy, spreads lies, bullshits, 
or fabricates data that cannot be presently disproven, or, at the highest level, encap-
sulates its audience in an unchallengeable false dogma, even an ideal logical thinker 
will struggle to correctly identify the propaganda. This second category of techniques 
can be called misinformation. These techniques are typically most effective when the 
propagandist is in an epistemically superior position to the propagandee; when the 
propagandist has knowledge that the propagandee is known to lack, the propaganda 
can be better tailored to appear proper. A censorship campaign might be particularly 
useful to a propaganda campaign using misinformation, as the censorship of views 
that contradict the propaganda is likely to increase the amount of certainty that prop-
agandees place in it, unless they become aware that a censorship campaign run by the 
propagandist exists. Large enough censorship and propaganda campaigns could make 
the propagandist the sole source of information for a propagandee, significantly wid-
ening the gap in knowledge held by the propagandist vis-à-vis the propagandee and 
increasing the possible efficacy of misinformation techniques. So long as a hypotheti-
cal perfect logical thinker does not have the knowledge necessary to contradict the 
information presented by propaganda using these misinformation techniques, their 
ability to correctly identify the propaganda is doubtful. This is a grave problem that 
will be explored further shortly.
Categories of  Propaganda
Similar to how propagandist techniques can be categorized, propaganda arguments 
can be divided into two categories: logically weak forms and logically strong forms. 
Note that these “weak” and “strong” monikers do not indicate the likelihood of a 
typical propagandee accepting or rejecting the propaganda. Factors like the pull of 
emotion and the capacity to process large amounts of information vary from indi-
vidual to individual. The power of techniques should not be discounted; a particularly 
emotionally compelling weak propaganda may garner more attention and acceptance 
than a stronger propaganda that uses misinformation. Different forms of propaganda 
will naturally work better or worse depending on the nature of the propagandee. In-
stead, the strength or weakness of propaganda in this context indicates the ability of 
the hypothetical perfect logical thinker established prior, serving as propagandee, to 
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identify the propaganda as such based on the stipulative definition, based on how its 
content presents a logical argument. 
For the purpose of categorization, independent arguments made by a single piece 
of propaganda should be judged independently, rather than judging the piece as a 
whole. When it is possible to place a propaganda argument in multiple categories, 
it should be placed in the weakest category that it qualifies for. When an argument 
contains multiple flaws or weaknesses within the same category, or additional flaws or 
weaknesses indicative of a stronger category, it may be called weaker than other argu-
ments within that category that lack these additional problems, but it should not be 
recategorized. When a single piece of propaganda, or a single original propagandist, 
advances multiple independent arguments that contradict each other, this does not 
affect the categorization of either argument, except in cases where either argument 
is supported by a premise that the propagandist is a reliable source of information, 
and where one of the contradicting arguments can be accepted as educative—both of 
these cases should result in a weak classification of the relevant argument.
Logically Weak Forms of  Propaganda
The logically weakest forms of propaganda are those whose argumentative structures 
are fundamentally flawed, who fail even when their premises are assumed true. Inva-
lid deductive arguments, where the necessary premises do not lead to the conclusion 
or contradict each other, are one example. Inductive arguments based entirely on 
premises that lack a connection with the conclusion provide another. Arguments that 
contain significant defeating evidence within themselves also fall under this category. 
Defeating evidence that is irreconcilable with an argument’s conclusion may not chal-
lenge the truth of premises that do support the conclusion, but the acceptance of this 
evidence deprives these other premises of their explanatory power, making the entire 
argument weak. Additionally, this category includes arguments using uncertain forms 
of inference that ascribe absolute certainty to their conclusions. Logicians know to 
reject these arguments outright, before evaluating the truth of the premises.
Another weak form of propaganda, approaching something more moderate in 
strength, includes arguments that are predicated on at least one false premise and 
arguments whose conclusions are defeated by outside evidence, where near-certain 
knowledge of this defeating evidence or the falsity of necessary premises is readily 
available to the propagandee. This form is stronger than the last because it requires 
the propagandee to look outside of the propaganda in order to dismiss it—to outside 
evidence or to necessary sub-arguments that the propaganda itself does not engage 
with. However, the propagandee must border on certainty in their knowledge of this 
outside information in order to still call this form weak.
These weak forms of propaganda may use either misdirection or misinformation tech-
niques, although if they use misinformation, they do so poorly, either including con-
tradictory information within themselves or touting easily refuted lies. Belief in weak 
propagandas is always logically unjustified. If the perfect logical thinker were also 
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omnipotent, all strong propagandas would appear to be of this second weak variety. 
But the perfect logical thinker is meant to be placed in the epistemic position of the 
typical propagandee, and most propagandees lack omnipotence. For that reason, logi-
cally weak propagandas should be differentiated from those that are logically strong.
Logically Strong Forms of  Propaganda
Logically strong forms of propaganda are different from weak forms in that they can-
not be fully discounted, either for practical or logical reasons. In order to evaluate 
them, these strong forms always require the propagandee to engage with uncertain 
forms of inference, like inductive reasoning, as if their propagandizing flaws con-
cerned matters of actual certainty, these flaws would be readily available, and the 
perfect logical thinker would not be deceivable. Almost all propagandas of this type 
use misinformation techniques.7 
A moderate-strong form of propaganda leaves the logical thinker in a position of great 
uncertainty. This category includes non-deductive arguments that are advanced by a 
dubious source—since they might be omitting some important information—and 
arguments that rely on a premise whose truth is only established by a dubious source. 
Reasonable grounds to distrust a source include vested interests, a lack of expertise or 
experience, and prior unreliability or bias on the part of the source in relation to the 
subject matter of the argument (Savellos & Galvin, 2001, p. 40). One hypothetical 
example is the case of a historically untrustworthy political party in a one-party state 
claiming to have done something good via its foreign policy. The logical grounds for 
accepting the argument are weak. However, it is difficult to reject this argument out-
right, as the argument follows a proper form and there is no stronger evidence avail-
able to suggest that the premises or conclusion are not true. The political party might 
be telling the truth, and there is no alternative source for this kind of information 
available that is more trustworthy. This propaganda could also thrive in multi-party 
states, if all of the political parties are equally untrustworthy and in continual disa-
greement. If three or four known liars are making equally plausible conflicting argu-
ments, it is impossible to logically determine which one of them, if any, to believe. 
The logical thinker is doing their epistemic duty best by remaining skeptical, refusing 
to pass a judgement. However, absolute skepticism is often infeasible. If the logical 
thinker is prompted to act on a dubious set of information, skepticism does not seem 
to always justify inaction, as inaction may carry graver consequences than action. The 
7: The only exception that I can conceive of is the case discussed in footnote 6: propagandas that 
are created when an individual communicates a justified false belief that does not arise from another 
propaganda. Such cases need not necessarily involve any technique; since the original propagandist 
legitimately thinks they are spreading the truth, and is justified in thinking so as long as they have 
not failed any epistemic duty (e.g. has properly considered potential defeating evidence), they are 
neither lying nor bullshitting. Still, this appears to be a fringe case, and propagandas of this type seem 
unlikely to persist—the example in footnote 6 would probably be resolved quickly once the fans 
encounter overwhelming defeating evidence, and would learn to be more skeptical about the radio’s 
messages thereafter.
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logical thinker may have to make a choice more or less at random. The best they can 
do is make preparations for the possibility that their decision was the wrong one.
The strongest forms of propaganda present themselves as fully proper arguments 
backed by strong sources, causing the logical thinker to accept them with a high 
degree of confidence. To illustrate how this can work: a well-respected, trustworthy 
authority in the environmental scientific community might break from character af-
ter accepting a backroom bribe, deciding to provide falsified evidence in support of a 
land development plan, which has been embroiled in controversy due to fears over its 
environmental impact. Objectively, this scientist is not trustworthy, at least not when 
they are being offered large sums of money to settle controversial issues. However, 
from the perspective of a propagandee who cannot test the environmental impact of 
the plan themselves, there is no logical reason to distrust them if they have settled past 
controversies truthfully, since they do not know about the bribe. If they have a say in 
approving the plan, they should greenlight it, barring some other reason for rejection. 
Even if the scientist’s evidence is proven incorrect, it might not be justified to discount 
them in all future environmental controversies if they have a strong record overall, as 
this instance could appear to have been the result of an honest mistake. Unless direct 
evidence of the bribe or forgery came to light, the supposition that they have been 
corrupted from a single instance would be an illogical conspiracy theory. Without ac-
cess to additional information, there is no way to logically identify strong propaganda 
from the propagandee’s perspective, at least not until after we have accepted it and 
suffered its consequences.
Resistance to Propaganda
With these distinctions and attributes of propagandas in mind, we can begin to con-
sider how they might be resisted by an individual subjected to them, so that their neg-
ative epistemic influence is reduced. This is a topic that calls for additional research; 
an entire project of equal length to this one could be dedicated to discussing how a 
single type of propaganda might be resisted. I can only offer a cursory glance at some 
considerations for the ways that the epistemic effect of propaganda can be mitigated.
Resistance to Weak Forms
The first step to reducing the influence of propaganda from the perspective of a propa-
gandee is to recognize propaganda for what it is, to unmask it. That is where the logi-
cal definition of propaganda developed in this project becomes practically relevant. By 
taking informational media that have been created or affected by a mind, the source 
of intention, which consequently might carry some message intended to be received 
by the propagandee, and analyzing them from a logical perspective, by breaking down 
their contents and seeing how they form certain arguments, one can hope to at least 
unveil logically weak forms of propaganda.
Two problems emerge: First, virtually anything that has been influenced by another 
person—whether a textbook, a lecture, an academic journal, a painting, a sculpture, a 
21
Badalamenti: An Epistemological Account of the Logic of Propaganda
Published by KnightScholar, 2021
164
piece of music, a graph, a public performance, the color of a product, the context in 
which an otherwise benign object is placed—could serve a propagandist purpose. It 
would be impossible for a person to analyze every informational medium, every po-
tentially propagandist item, that they encounter in this way, even if they knew which 
media have and have not been affected by people. Second, a propagandee cannot 
directly perceive the intentions of other minds that produce propaganda. There is un-
certainty in knowing which messages are actually intended and which a propagandee 
has mistakenly perceived for themselves as a result of exposure to an informational 
medium. 
How can these problems be circumvented? For the first problem, a more manageable 
list of things that a person should analyze in this way, based on the likelihood that 
these things will include propaganda and have a practical effect on one’s life or society, 
must be constructed. An individual might be inclined to start by analyzing things 
that seem to have a noticeable impact on their beliefs, especially those beliefs that are 
foundational to motivating other beliefs or substantial actions. It would be a waste 
of time to analyze ineffective or inconsequential propagandas. However, some propa-
gandas find success by virtue of their subtlety: they affect belief without calling much 
conscious attention to themselves. An individual therefore must occasionally look to 
informational media that initially appear more benign as well. Things that seem to 
invoke some propagandist technique, like media that incite some emotion, may be 
more likely to be propaganda, and thus may be deserving of particular attention. 
Another list of things worth evaluating could be based on their known origin. Certain 
people or organizations, particularly those in a position to gain from people hold-
ing certain beliefs, like an elected official or a company behind a new product, may 
be more likely to produce propaganda. Such a list could then be further refined by 
establishing the trustworthiness of particular individuals or organizations, based on 
the frequency of their messages being educative or propagandist. One would then be 
justified in approaching the claims of established sources with initial belief or doubt, 
only fully analyzing their claims occasionally to check for change, making room to 
evaluate the claims of newcomers. 
A list might also be established by topic: propaganda might be produced for certain 
topics, like causes for warfare, more often than others, and certain topics might have 
a greater relevance to one’s life or society than others. Certain kinds of media could 
be more conducive to communicating propaganda, too. By developing such lists, a 
propagandee could prioritize analyzing more impactful and more suspect informa-
tional media, thereby unmasking and reducing the influence of more propagandas 
that have a greater negative epistemic impact than one who analyzes informational 
media at random.
As for the second problem, it is true that, without an original propagandist’s commen-
tary—which is unlikely to come to light, especially in cases where they are seeking 
malevolent or selfish ends—it can be difficult to know the intended message within 
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an informational medium, if there is one, with a high degree of certainty. Still, the 
author’s intent may be discernable by using clues within a supposed propaganda’s 
content and original context. Necessarily intentional elements, like words in a poster 
or cartoon, might be discernible from potentially accidental elements, like vague facial 
expressions or backgrounds. If so, it makes sense to focus on the intentional elements 
and include as many of them as possible in a complete mapping of the propagan-
da’s arguments. Consider the source, if available: the supposed original propagandist 
might have interests that are naturally apparent, and certain arguments may serve 
these interests better than others. When multiple informational media share a source, 
there could be a common trend among their messages. A piece might be clearly in-
tended for a certain audience, or could have multiple messages intended for different 
audiences that perceive it. The propaganda may anticipate and appeal to the typical 
beliefs of such intended audiences, so these beliefs may form part of the propaganda’s 
argument. 
Confidence that a certain message is intended may be increased by having multiple 
people independently analyze the piece, especially if those people are from differ-
ent backgrounds and are not biased to think that the piece must be or must not be 
intended for them. Evaluating multiple interpretations is probably a good thing, at 
least for epistemic purposes, as even if one of the messages being considered was un-
intended, better classified as a misinterpretation than a propaganda or educative argu-
ment, considering it on its logical merits alone is likely to give the analyst knowledge 
regarding its substance.
Once a weak propaganda argument is unmasked, it can be refuted on the basis of its 
clear improperness. Still, this may be easier said than done—the perfect logical think-
er only exists as a hypothetical. Social pressures to conform and other practical consid-
erations may make it rational for an individual to continue to accept propaganda, at 
least publicly, although the public act of accepting it may cause them to truly believe 
in it over time. Psychological phenomena that propaganda techniques appeal to, like 
emotion and habitual responses, may also make it difficult for an individual to fully 
relinquish belief in a propaganda. 
Resistance to Strong Forms
When it comes to strong forms of propaganda, the propagandee faces even greater dif-
ficulties in resisting them. Regarding moderate-strong forms, they encounter the same 
issues in discovering them as they do with weak forms. However, it becomes even 
more difficult for the propagandee to abandon a moderate-strong propaganda after 
it is found; it cannot be practically discounted, since there are no logically superior 
alternatives to turn to and agnosticism on the propaganda’s subject may be impractical 
or logically undesirable.
The strongest forms of propaganda appear almost impossible to resist. Since they lev-
erage the fact that the propagandee lacks the knowledge necessary to recognize them, 
they cannot be unmasked, as they appear indistinguishable from proper educative 
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arguments. If they cannot even be identified, how could they be resisted? Consider 
then a society captured by this kind of propaganda, as in the case of Ellul’s total propa-
ganda, something that a person born in Nazi Germany might have experienced had 
that regime persisted for a few generations and succeeded in its terrible designs. That 
individual, the regime’s perpetual propagandee, would scarcely be better off than the 
subject of Descartes’ evil demon when trying to gain knowledge about subjects where 
propaganda is necessary to legitimizing the regime—the individual’s logical reasoning 
would continually lead them to false conclusions, as the only evidence available to 
them would have been carefully crafted to deceive them. They might assume educa-
tive arguments to be a weak form of propaganda, as they have been so convinced of 
certain false beliefs that they accept them as axioms. Such an individual could adopt a 
true belief by supposing that the regime is lying, but this idea would be a speculative 
conspiracy theory without evidence, making belief in this idea unjustified, a lucky 
guess at the truth, not knowledge. The epistemic prospects of this individual appear 
considerably limited.
Perhaps there exists some nonlogical means that could root out these propagandas 
more often than not, but what could these means be? I cannot conceive of any ap-
proach to information that could be more reliable in discerning truth from false-
hood than logical reasoning. This possibility aside, only a position of total skepticism, 
where the individual adopts an agnostic, noncommitted position towards all ideas by 
jettisoning all beliefs—except for those that are necessarily true, like a belief in self-
existence—would ensure that a person is totally protected from the influence of prop-
aganda; but it cannot be justified to adopt this position. The motivation for resisting 
propaganda here is to curb its negative epistemic effect on individuals, its ability to 
prevent them from gaining knowledge and inculcate them with unjustified or false 
beliefs. Total skepticism would throw out the bulk of real knowledge alongside propa-
ganda. That position would only appear to be justifiable if it is worse for an individual 
to hold a preponderance of false and unjustified beliefs than no beliefs at all and it is 
true that propagandas tend to capture the individual more often than real knowledge.
A skeptic encounters a paradox if they justify their skepticism in this way. They need 
to believe that people are probably more prone to propaganda than knowledge, yet 
they cannot seem to hold this belief without abandoning their skepticism. This para-
dox aside, I argue it is more reasonable to disbelieve the premise that strong propa-
gandas tend to capture people more often than real knowledge. If this were the case, 
it would seem to me that the history and continued survival of humanity could only 
be explained as an accident, or as an inevitability thanks to some outside force, two 
explanations I consider to be unlikely. Our understanding of the deeper mechanisms 
at play might be muddled and inaccurate, but the practical utility of many ideas—our 
ability to predict outcomes and act accordingly, the mere ability of many of us to sur-
vive for eighty years, never mind our technological progress—seems to suggest that we 
do hold more knowledge than propaganda, at least concerning matters of significance 
contained within this reality. Selective skepticisms towards specific topics where we—
either as a collective or individuals—appear less certain in our knowledge, or where 
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agnosticism might be preferable to taking a position, are justified: for example, I know 
that, having never studied theoretical physics in depth, my understanding of string 
theory is probably shoddy, and so I choose to take no position on whether the theory 
is likely true or false, especially since my life will probably remain practically unaf-
fected no matter what position or non-position I take. But these selective skepticisms 
must be formed on the basis of some knowledge, otherwise their random adoption 
risks throwing out knowledge and its practical effects at the same rate as propaganda.
We must therefore accept the risk that we are sometimes being deceived by strog 
propagandas. Perhaps the best way for an individual to compensate for this reality 
without creating larger epistemic problems for themselves is by holding on to the 
possibility that any of their beliefs may be wrong, by remaining flexible and adjusting 
their beliefs according to the newest proper evidence as it emerges. Still, this could be 
infeasible. Going back to constantly reevaluate the veracity of your beliefs is a labori-
ous task. It might be necessary for individuals to hold some beliefs axiomatically, even 
if such certainty is unjustified, in order for them to gain further knowledge within a 
field.
Resistance to Propaganda at the Societal Level
The prospects of an individual attempting to avoid propaganda entirely seem rather 
grim, but perhaps solutions can be found at the societal level, outside of the individu-
al. Such solutions could strive to either reduce the ability of people to produce propa-
ganda, reduce their interest in creating it, increase the ability or interest in producing 
real education, or increase the public’s awareness of or ability to resist propaganda.
One significant debate focuses on the epistemic benefits of free speech versus the cen-
sorship of propaganda. Even though it will allow for the production of propaganda, 
free speech might carry epistemic benefits for a society: for example, the proliferation 
of improper arguments could be necessary to practicing and strengthening proper 
argumentation, while censoring propaganda could weaken our defenses against cen-
sored ideas and make them more alluring (Smart, 2018, p. 10-11). However, there is 
no guarantee that propaganda will not overwhelm a system with legally protected free 
speech, and it may be impossible to eliminate social pressures for conformity, allow-
ing for propagandas to still attain a hegemonic status, stifling knowledge. Meanwhile, 
the effectiveness of censoring propaganda is reliant upon the reliability of the censors, 
who must have both the ability to identify propaganda and a genuine interest in cen-
soring it. While censors may have access to additional information that puts them in a 
better position to identify propaganda than the average propagandee, an organization 
with the power to censor could be open to corruption and abuse. Censorship can be 
used to support propaganda as effectively as it can be used to support knowledge, if 
not more so.
Another way that a society could counter propaganda is by reducing epistemic in-
equality, since misinformation relies upon the propagandee’s ignorance relative to the 
propagandist. Jason Stanley suggests that economic equality is a means to this end. 
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Economic inequality makes people ignorant to the lived experiences of other classes, 
and furthermore causes them to dogmatically defend what they see as their class’s in-
terests out of economic anxiety (Stanley, 2015, p. 19). Reducing economic inequality 
would thus both reduce the differences in knowledge between groups of people that 
propaganda can exploit and mitigate a source of propaganda, since there would no 
longer be a widespread interest in producing propagandas to protect classist interests.
Sponsoring publicly-accessible true education would be another means of reducing 
epistemic inequality, although, just as in the case of censorship, it carries a risk. If the 
sponsors of such education struggle to discern propaganda themselves, or have an 
interest in spreading propaganda, then they may, intentionally or not, contribute to 
the dissemination of propaganda in a society. Classes that teach people about logical 
reasoning could improve their ability to recognize and resist weak propagandas. 
A more controversial means of eliminating propaganda might involve eliminating 
rights to privacy. If a truly trustworthy state actor had access to and recorded every 
action committed by every individual, the state would have far more evidence that it 
could use to discern propaganda from knowledge, enabling them to censor or expose 
propagandists. Alternatively, every citizen could be given such access to every other 
citizen, so that anyone could make such determinations. If there were some way to 
read people’s thoughts, memories, and intentions using technology, the production of 
many types of propaganda, particularly those that are intentionally deceptive for the 
propagandist’s benefit at the propagandee’s expense, would be virtually impossible.
Finally, the fields of virtue and vice epistemology might reveal how the attitudes 
and dispositions of individuals could be changed—either on a mass scale via social 
pressures or by a person themselves—so that people are more naturally resistant to 
propaganda. For example, dogmatism, the habit of clinging to a rigid set of ideas 
even if they are challenged, is an epistemic vice that has an overall effect of prevent-
ing an individual from gaining knowledge, even if it protects some knowledge from 
propagandist attacks (Beatson et al., 2019, p. 49-50). Cultivating more of a healthy 
skepticism or ideological flexibility in lieu of dogmatism may eliminate the ability of 
propagandas to use dogmatic beliefs as a vector, and may make educative arguments 
more likely to succeed over propaganda.
Of course, these solutions are only some cursory suggestions, potential remedies. I 
have not considered their efficacy on any basis other than the possibility that they 
might liberate a society’s individuals from the influence of propaganda, enabling them 
to gain more knowledge. Some of these solutions, like ending rights to privacy, are 
certainly ethically dubious, and therefore probably should not be adopted. Others 
might be impractical or impossible to implement, either from a technical or policy 
standpoint—for example, attempts to alter school curricula might face significant 
pushback from teachers or parents. Some of these solutions may even have a negative 
epistemic effect at a collective level: for example, from the perspective of the idea of 
Mandevillian intelligence in social epistemology, a system may be able to gain more 
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knowledge overall if some of its epistemic agents have certain epistemic vices that 
cause them to produce propaganda (Smart, 2018, p. 10-11, 15-16). Paradoxically, a 
bit of propaganda that limits the knowledge of some individuals might increase the 
availability of knowledge to a society overall. The value of the ability for individuals 
to gain knowledge must be weighed vis-à-vis these other considerations if one seeks to 
appraise the full impact of a proposed change on an individual or society.
Concluding Remarks
When I began this project, I had hoped to find some way to conclusively identify 
propaganda, so that I could avoid it and develop opinions for myself that were better 
informed. I believe that I have at least found some success in this goal. I have found 
a way to describe propaganda objectively and, in doing so, have revealed how many 
propaganda can be identified and avoided. As a result, I have been able to begin 
reevaluating the standing of some of my own beliefs, to consider how I adopted them 
and the legitimacy of the arguments made in support of them, so that I can find bet-
ter grounding for them, reject them when counterarguments appear more proper, or 
develop a healthy degree of skepticism around them when all appears uncertain.
Yet I cannot help but feel somewhat dissatisfied. To be secure in all of our beliefs, to 
resist propaganda entirely without jettisoning real knowledge alongside it, borders on 
the impossible: it would either require omniscience or the absence of propagandist 
intentions from the world. Even resisting logically weak forms of propaganda presents 
major challenges, rooted in the practical but limited nature of the human psyche 
and non-epistemic concerns. Furthermore, if such weak propaganda is successfully 
resisted, the issue of truth remains. Proving an argument to be flawed does not prove 
its conclusion to be false. Educative arguments still must be discovered on their own, 
adding to the work necessary to gain true knowledge. It seems to me that, while we 
can actively work to curb its influence, we are ultimately destined to live with propa-
ganda, that there will never be a way to eliminate propaganda altogether.
One might place hope in the future, believing that advancements in technology will 
make propaganda easier to reveal or harder to produce. I am more pessimistic about 
the future’s prospects. I am a member of the first generation to be raised entirely in 
the context of a popularized and accessible internet, which has enabled instant access 
to insane amounts of information and fostered the development of a truly global mass 
culture. On one hand, the internet has made it easier than ever before to learn new 
skills, conduct research, share one’s findings, and interact with other people, suggest-
ing that it has the potential to spread knowledge to all, to reduce propaganda’s influ-
ence. However, the internet has simultaneously made it easier to disseminate propa-
ganda, obscure the source of information, and confirm one’s own biases, as evidence 
for virtually any belief can be found online, alongside a community of people espous-
ing said beliefs. Meanwhile, other technologies have enabled the production of more 
convincing fabrications, like deep fakes, that can be used to support propaganda. The 
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mere existence of this technology casts doubts upon genuine evidence as well, making 
the truth more difficult to discern.
That said, I am not convinced that technology will necessarily make it harder to 
gain knowledge in the future, either. Technologies present opportunities to enhance 
both education and propaganda. I believe that our real epistemic future will be de-
termined by how society reacts to these technological changes culturally, socially, and 
politically, and by how these reactions accommodate or complicate the production 
and consumption of propaganda versus education. We have some ability to affect 
the conditions of our future, and we should seek one that includes our betterment, 
whatever that betterment may entail. I cannot claim to know what we should do to 
achieve a better future, except that I know that the best way we can realize substantial 
solutions is through perception, reflection, and discussion of the evidence available 
to us. Therefore, I argue that we must continuously explore, consider, and debate the 
topics touched on by this project and the multitude of perspectives on them, and take 
action to advance what we know to be the right response once we are secure in that 
knowledge to the best of our ability. I can only hope that I have made a positive con-
tribution to that effort here, that I have succeeded in rendering, both for myself and 
for you, the reader, some knowledge about propaganda.
Appendix
The appendix includes interpretations, per the stipulative definition, of additional 
real pieces of propaganda, similar to the interpretation of the World War I poster 
in the main body of the text. The interpretations here should not be considered ex-
haustive of the propaganda arguments contained in each respective piece. They are 
included to show how propaganda can be found and analyzed across a wide variety of 
informational media. The appendix is located in the online edition of Proceedings of 
GREAT Day 2020, found at https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-
day/vol2020/iss1/16.
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